Dutch defense chief says F-35 can be jailbroken like an iPhone

Netherlands defense official claims F-35 jailbreak

Netherlands Defense Secretary Gijs Tuinman recently stated that European forces could "jailbreak" the Lockheed Martin F-35 fighter jet to modify its software without permission from the United States. Tuinman made the comparison during an interview on the Boekestijn en De Wijk podcast, suggesting that the aircraft’s digital architecture is not an absolute barrier to sovereign control.

The comments surfaced during a discussion about European military independence and the potential for the US to withdraw support as a primary ally. Tuinman characterized the F-35 as a shared product where mutual dependency defines the relationship between manufacturers and operators. He pointed to Rolls-Royce engines produced in Britain as a critical component that the US requires for its own fleet.

Tuinman acknowledged the sensitivity of his statement but insisted that technical workarounds remain an option for European nations. He suggested that even if the US stopped providing official software updates, the F-35 would remain superior to other fighter types in its current state. The "jailbreak" would serve as a last resort to ensure the aircraft remains operational during a diplomatic or supply chain breakdown.

European forces want software autonomy

The desire to modify F-35 software stems from a growing anxiety across Europe regarding US foreign policy and military aid. European defense officials are increasingly concerned that a change in US administration could lead to restricted access to critical military technologies. If the US government decided to withhold software patches or mission data, European fleets could become effectively grounded.

Tuinman’s remarks imply that the Netherlands and other European partners possess the technical expertise to maintain the aircraft's software stack independently. This would involve bypassing Lockheed Martin’s proprietary locks to install custom code or integrate non-US weaponry. Currently, most operators must wait for official "service packs" to update their systems.

The F-35 relies on a complex digital ecosystem to fly, target enemies, and share data with other units. Without software updates, the aircraft loses its edge in electronic warfare and sensor fusion. European nations currently spend billions on these platforms and want to ensure they aren't buying a "black box" that the US can disable at will.

The logistics system controlling updates

The F-35 Lightning II manages its software and maintenance through the Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS). This centralized network tracks the health of every aircraft in the global fleet and distributes technical data. Lockheed Martin designed ALIS to streamline operations, but critics argue it creates a single point of failure and a mechanism for US control.

Updates through ALIS typically arrive in major service packs every one to two years. These updates cover everything from flight control laws to the threat libraries used to identify enemy radar. If a nation is cut off from ALIS, it loses the ability to diagnose hardware faults or update its combat software.

• ALIS handles mission planning and threat analysis for all standard operators.
• The system requires a constant connection to Lockheed Martin servers for full functionality.
• The US government maintains final approval over which countries receive specific software features.
• Most European partners currently lack the legal or technical right to view the F-35 source code.

The complexity of ALIS makes a "jailbreak" significantly more difficult than modifying consumer electronics. The system is integrated into the hardware of the jet, meaning unauthorized changes could cause catastrophic flight failures. Tuinman did not provide a technical roadmap for how the Netherlands would achieve this bypass without Lockheed Martin’s cooperation.

Security experts doubt public hacks

Cybersecurity researchers suggest that while a jailbreak is theoretically possible, the barriers to entry are extreme compared to an iPhone. Ken Munro, a specialist at Pen Test Partners, noted that the lack of physical access prevents the broader hacking community from finding vulnerabilities. Researchers cannot simply buy a decommissioned F-35 on eBay to probe its operating system for bugs.

The military hardware environment relies entirely on defense contractors to secure systems during the design phase. Because there is no public research community for fighter jets, accidental security flaws often go undiscovered for years. This "security through obscurity" model means that any successful jailbreak would likely require state-level resources and classified documentation.

Munro argued that the commercial motivation for hacking consumer devices does not exist for military hardware. While thousands of hackers compete to find the first iOS exploit, only a handful of state actors have the capability to target an F-35. This makes the discovery of "innovative attacks" much slower than in the consumer tech sector.

Israel holds the only exception

Israel remains the only nation that has successfully negotiated a deal to run its own software on the F-35. The Israeli Air Force operates a modified version of the aircraft known as the F-35I "Adir." This agreement allows Israel to install its own electronic warfare suites and command-and-control systems on top of the Lockheed Martin architecture.

This special status provides Israel with a level of digital sovereignty that European nations currently lack. The F-35I can integrate indigenous missiles and sensors without waiting for the US to write the necessary code. European officials like Tuinman are likely looking at the Adir model as a blueprint for their own future autonomy.

Lockheed Martin has historically resisted granting similar access to other partners to protect its intellectual property. The company referred all inquiries regarding Tuinman’s comments to the US government. The Pentagon has not officially responded to the claim that its flagship fighter can be compromised by its own allies.

Rumors of a remote kill switch

Concerns about a remote "kill switch" have circulated within European defense circles for years. Joachim Schranzhofer, a communications head at German contractor Hensoldt, previously stated that the idea of a US-controlled shutdown mechanism is more than just a rumor. This fear intensified after the US paused military aid to Ukraine, which relies on US-made F-16 fighters.

If a kill switch exists, the US could theoretically disable the electronics of an F-35 fleet remotely if a country used the jets against US interests. This possibility has driven several nations to reconsider their procurement strategies. Portugal recently dropped its plans to buy the F-35, citing political concerns and a desire for greater independence.

Recent data from Tussell shows that the UK is also shifting its defense spending away from US-centric projects. The British government is directing more of its budget toward European-led initiatives to reduce its reliance on American supply chains. The following factors are driving this shift in European defense policy:

• Fear of US isolationism and the withdrawal of NATO support.
• The need for sovereign control over mission data and weapon integration.
• The high cost of Lockheed Martin maintenance contracts and software fees.
• Development of the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) as a domestic alternative.

Tuinman's "jailbreak" comment reflects a broader movement where allies are no longer willing to accept total digital dependence. Whether or not the F-35 can actually be hacked like a smartphone, the rhetoric alone signals a significant tension in the transatlantic defense partnership. European nations are signaling that they will find ways to keep their jets in the air, with or without a green light from Washington.